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BLD-201        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-2029 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  HECTOR L. HUERTAS, 
     Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United  
States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
(Related to D.C. No. 1-17-cv-01891) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
May 30, 2019 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE and PORTER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 13, 2019) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Hector Huertas petitions for a writ of mandamus.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will deny the petition.  
Huertas filed suit pro se in the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey in connection with his purchase of a used car on December 22, 2016.  Huertas 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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claimed that he was under duress when he purchased the car at an inflated price and on 
credit terms that he could not afford.  Huertas claimed that he went to the Cherry Hill 
Mitsubishi dealership and was told that he qualified to purchase a car with no down 
payment.  He ultimately purchased a 2013 Hyundai Sonata for $17,000.95, signing a 
Motor Vehicle Retail Order Agreement which contained an arbitration provision.  
Huertas sought, but evidently was unable, to cancel the sale, and this suit alleging 
violations of various state and federal consumer protection laws followed.  Huertas 
sought compensatory and statutory damages in the amount of $81,092.40 and punitive 
damages.   
Defendants Foulke Management Corp., Cherry Hill Mitsubishi, Cherry Hill 
Triplex, and Anthony Trapani (“Foulke”) moved to dismiss the complaint and compel 
arbitration on the ground that Huertas signed an arbitration agreement that required him 
to arbitrate his claims.  Defendant Capital One separately moved to dismiss the complaint 
and compel arbitration.1  In response to Capital One’s motion, Huertas moved to amend 
his complaint.  In an order entered on December 18, 2017, the District Court (1) granted 
Foulke’s motion to compel arbitration but stayed Huertas’ claims against Foulke pending 
the arbitrator’s decision concerning arbitrability of the claims; (2) ordered that Capital 
One’s motion to compel arbitration be administratively terminated; and (3) dismissed 
Huertas’ motion to amend without prejudice for failure to comply with L. Civ. R. 7.1(f).  
                                              
1 Foulke assigned its rights under the sales contract to Capital One. 
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The Court determined that, because Huertas challenged the validity of the sales contract 
as a whole, in accordance with the arbitration agreement’s delegation clause and Rent-A-
Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68-69 (2010), his substantive claims, as well 
as his challenges concerning arbitrability, all must be decided by the arbitrator.2 
On or about May 29, 2018, Arbitrator Robert K. Amron determined preliminarily 
that the arbitration agreement was valid and that he had jurisdiction to arbitrate Huertas’ 
consumer fraud claims against Foulke.  Huertas then renewed his motion to amend his 
complaint with respect to Capital One; the District Court granted the motion in part; and 
Capital One moved to dismiss the amended complaint and compel arbitration.  Huertas 
also filed a motion to vacate the Arbitrator’s decision.   
In an order entered on March 13, 2019, the District Court (1) denied Capital One’s 
motion to dismiss pending expedited discovery on issues relevant to whether Huertas’ 
claims against Capital One were subject to arbitration;3 and (2) denied as premature 
Huertas’ motion to vacate the Arbitrator’s decision concerning the extent of his 
jurisdiction with respect to the claims against Foulkes.  On May 15, 2019, Capital One 
                                              
2 In Rent-A-Center, the Supreme Court held that a provision of an employment 
agreement which delegated to an arbitrator exclusive authority to resolve any dispute 
relating to the agreement’s enforceability was a valid delegation under the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”).  We note that the FAA represents “a congressional declaration 
of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”  Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
3 See generally Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 774-75  
(3d Cir. 2013) (if affirmative defense of arbitrability is not apparent from face of 
complaint, motion to compel arbitration should be decided under summary judgment 
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answered the amended complaint.  The Magistrate Judge assigned to this matter has 
scheduled a conference for July 2, 2019 to arrive at a schedule to manage discovery. 
Although the case is ongoing in the District Court, on May 7, 2019, Huertas filed a 
petition for writ of mandamus pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, 
challenging the U.S. District Judge’s December 18, 2017 and March 13, 2019 orders.  He 
asks that we direct the District Judge assigned to his case to vacate those orders, arguing 
that they were issued in excess of the District Judge’s jurisdiction.  Specifically, Huertas 
complains that the District Judge has unnecessarily delayed resolution of his claims by 
referring an arbitrability question to the Arbitrator, ordering discovery, and blocking his 
efforts to appeal to this Court by issuing nonfinal interlocutory orders.  He also argues 
that the Arbitrator’s decision on arbitrability is in conflict with Goffe v. Foulke 
Management Corp., 185 A.3d 248 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 2018).  Extraordinary 
circumstances are present, he argues, and can only be remedied by issuance of the writ.  
The Hyundai is not roadworthy, he claims, and if Capital One had notified him that he 
qualified for a $17,000 auto loan, he would have “shopped around different dealers for 
the best price.”  Petition, at 26. 
We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.  A writ of mandamus is an 
extraordinary remedy.  In re: Pressman-Gutman Co., Inc., 459 F.3d 383, 398 (3d Cir. 
2006).  The petitioner must have no other adequate means to obtain the relief desired and 
                                                                                                                                                  
standard). 
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must show a “clear and indisputable” right to the writ.  See Kerr v. United States District 
Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976).  A writ of mandamus may not issue if a petitioner can 
obtain relief by way of an appeal.  See Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1996), 
superseded in part on other grounds by 3d Cir. LAR 24.1(c).  Under 9 U.S.C. § 16(b), an 
interlocutory order granting a motion to compel arbitration is not immediately appealable.  
Section 16 “makes clear that any order favoring litigation over arbitration is immediately 
appealable and any order favoring arbitration over litigation is not.”  Ballay v. Legg 
Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 878 F.2d 729, 732 (3d Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).  
Nevertheless, Huertas may obtain any relief he is due by appealing at the conclusion of 
his case in the District Court.   
Huertas argues that he will be prejudiced if he is required to wait until the 
conclusion of his case to appeal but the argument is unavailing.  Review after final 
judgment is sufficient to cure the harm to a litigant who has lost his case in the District 
Court.  See Madden, 102 F.3d at 78.  To the extent that Huertas focuses his argument on 
the Goffe case, the relevance of Goffe to arbitrability and the circumstances of his 
purchase of the Hyundai may be fully considered on appeal.4  Moreover, the management 
                                              
4 Goffe involved two plaintiffs, one of whom purchased a Buick at the Cherry Hill 
Mitsubishi dealership and signed several documents, including one that contained an 
arbitration provision.  The plaintiff later cancelled the sales contract.  The trial court ruled 
that the matter was subject to arbitration and dismissed the case.  On appeal, the 
Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court reversed and remanded, holding 
that “the circumstances surrounding the execution of the documents in question raise 
legitimate questions about the enforceability of defendants’ otherwise acceptable 
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of her docket is committed to the sound discretion of the District Judge.  See In re: Fine 
Paper Antitrust Litigation, 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982).  Here, the alleged delay is in 
no way tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction.  See Madden, 102 F.3d at 79. 
                                                                                                                                                  
arbitration provisions, namely: (a) whether … an enforceable sales contract was ever 
formed; (b) whether, in both cases, defendants complied with [N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-
2.22], and (c) whether -- with the agreements to rescind reached by the parties in both 
cases -- the arbitration provisions contained in the sales contracts were also rescinded.”  
185 A.3d at 256. 
